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Summary
Contrary to the common understanding that collective memory functions as 
a driver for fostering domestic peace, stability, a common national identity, 
and serves as a cornerstone for the realisation of specific national goals, our 
aim is to show how collective memory is understood as a constitutive element 
of foreign policy narratives and how memory can influence foreign policy 
choices (Anderson, 1983; Gillis, 199 4; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Bodnar, 
1992; Schudson, 1993; Dian, 2017). Building on the work of Müller (2002), 
Bell (2010), Langenbacher and Shain (2010), Resende and Budryte (2014), 
Dian (2017) and Bachleitner (2018), we will argue that Serbia’s foreign poli-
cy choice in 2013 to sign the agreement with Kosovo is best understood with 
the help of an interpretative approach to foreign policy, as this issue de facto 
reflected the continuation of the role of sacrifice within Serbian collective 
memory. A narrative of victimisation was used to efficiently bridge the ‘guilt’ 
and tie it to the notion of great powers’ intervention. This article also examines 
the paradox of Serbia’s endeavours to hold on to Kosovo by looking into how 
the struggle over the nation’s past provides the fundamental ideational back-
ground for contemporary foreign policy choices. 
Keywords: Collective Memory, Interpretative Approach, Foreign Policy Choi-
ces, Narratives, Myth
Introduction
Understanding contemporary social and political dynamics in correlation with the 
phenomenon of belongingness is never easy. For this reason, scholars utilize his-
tory and historical narratives to determine the factors that pave the way towards the 
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formation of national identity. Through the erection of a shared past and common 
origin, that is, by answering the questions of who we are and where we come from, 
national histories aim to empower people to conceive themselves as parts of nation-
al communities. By this, memory enters the public sphere, shapes national history 
and becomes a part and parcel of a social construction called collective memory. 
Indeed, collective memory is not concerned with history itself, but only with its 
legacy as it is remembered and interpreted (Halbwach, 1980). In this case, collec-
tive memory should be understood as an intersubjective understanding of the coun-
try’s past, which is used to make sense of a country’s identity and role in the world 
(Dian, 2017: 6). One of many empirical realities of this observation can be seen in 
the example of the Kosovo myth, which is perceived as a cornerstone to Serbia’s 
cultural and national identity (Subotić, 2016: 618). The constitutive myth of Serbian 
martyrdom at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, where predominantly Serbian Christian 
forces1 led by Lazar Hrebeljanović of Serbia fought against the Ottoman Turkish 
forces of Sultan Murad I, is deeply engraved into Serbia’s collective memory as the 
battle, which is remembered as a defeat,2 that led to the loss of independence and 
the ‘five century-long Turkish oppression’ (Djokić, 2009: 6). Even though the out-
come of the battle is rather dubious, the majority of historians agree upon the fact 
that both sides grieved substantial losses, and that both the Serbian Prince and the 
Ottoman Sultan were killed (Koljević, 1980; Djokić, 2009: 6). The cultural dimen-
sion in regard to the Kosovo narrative should be understood through the prism of 
the Serbian Patriarchate, which was established in 1346 in Peć (Metohija), followed 
by some of the most important churches and monasteries built by Serbian medieval 
sovereigns (Djokić, 2009: 6–7). 
The uniqueness of political and cultural position of Kosovo in Serbia’s collec-
tive memory was well-kept in the rich heroic poetry and in church archives dur-
ing the Ottoman era,3 but the significance, such as it has today, emerged in the 19th 
century alongside modern Serbian nationalism (Hosking and Schopflin, 1997). The 
(re)instrumentalisation of importance of Kosovo came on 28 June 1989, when Slo-
bodan Milošević went to Kosovo in order to address a crowd from all parts of Yugo-
1 Zupančič (2013: 156) argued that prince Lazar Hrebeljanović also invited Albanians to fight 
with them against the Ottoman Empire. 
2 Central to this defeat is the cult of Holy Martyr Lazar, who was, according to the legend, of-
fered a choice between an empire in heaven and an empire on earth by Holy Prophet Elijah 
(Djokić, 2009: 7). Lazar’s choice – a heavenly empire – meant that Ottomans would win but the 
Serbian nation would secure a kingdom in heaven. This sacrifice made at Kosovo turned a mili-
tary defeat into a moral victory (ibid.). 
3 Svetozar Koljević (1980) argued that the myth of Kosovo survived through centuries among 
a largely illiterate people. 
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slavia who assembled to rejoice the 600th anniversary of the battle, and continues to 
stay, in different form,4 in the core of the Serbian collective paradigm. An important 
indicator in explaining this is the speech by former Minister for Foreign Affairs Vuk 
Jeremić in 2011, three years after Kosovo’s independence, who said in Chicago that 
“For Serbs, Kosovo is like the very air they breathe, and it is the beating heart of 
their culture” (cited in Subotić 2016: 610). Two years later, when Serbia signed an 
agreement with Kosovo (the Brussels Agreement), accepting the authority of Ko-
sovo’s government over the entire disputed territory without official recognition, 
the Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić swore to the public that “Serbia will never 
cut their wrists and commit suicide by giving up Kosovo” (ibid.: 617). This foreign 
policy choice suggests that not all activities are driven by pure and instrumental 
purposes5 nor are they directed exclusively by social and political structure, but 
also by beliefs and intersubjective meanings (Dian, 2017: 22). Stemming from this, 
the interpretative approach to foreign policy is crucial in the equation as it offers an 
indicative theoretical toolkit to scrutinise the fundamental ideational background 
behind Serbia’s foreign policy choices towards Kosovo. It helps us explain why 
Serbia would clutch on to Kosovo at all costs, even if the latter does not offer any 
material benefit for them. Concepts, which are central for this type of analysis, are 
the following: beliefs, traditions, narrative, resistance, and dilemmas (ibid.: 22–23). 
The interpretative approach to foreign policy, which lies in the nexus of Foreign 
Policy Analysis and International Relations, suggests that just like individual agents 
operating in domestic policies, state behaviour in the international sphere can be 
expounded as a form of social practice, unfolding in a world of cognition, percep-
tion, misperception, and intersubjective meanings about how the world functions 
(Bevir and Daddow, 2015; Taylor and Tverski, 1992; Wendt, 1992; Rosati, Hagan 
and Sampson III, 1994). 
The paper aims to contribute, first, to a better understanding of the role of col-
lective memory in foreign policy by looking at how memory can function as a con-
stitutive element of foreign policy traditions and narratives, and how memory can 
influence foreign policy choices. Second, this paper will test a theoretical model, 
which was previously tested on two selected post-conflict scenarios after World 
War II (China and Japan), but failed to address the post-Cold War context. Stem-
4 A significant change could be observed from 2010 on, when the Serbian government steadi-
ly abandoned its prerogative of effective territorial control over Kosovo due to the fact that they 
started the EU-sponsored dialogue, but they have never changed the position in terms of recog-
nition (Subotić, 2016: 620). 
5 By refusing to accept Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Serbia is de facto delaying the 
EU accession process. The instrumental purpose in this regard would be the recognition which 
would then serve as a signal of Serbia’s commitment to the European path. 
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ming from this, the paper also seeks to understand the specific place of Kosovo in 
Serbian collective memory. Finally, the paper builds on the empirical reality of Ser-
bia and Kosovo, which is, in terms of the proposed theoretical approach, particu-
larly rare in the existing literature. 
The article proceeds as follows. It begins with a discussion on collective me-
mory in International Relations (IR), and in particular the role of collective memory 
in foreign policy. Here, we will build on Dian’s (2017) interpretative approach to 
foreign policy, which functions as a theoretical toolkit to assess the ideational back-
ground of foreign policy choices by looking at how memory becomes a part and 
parcel of the above mentioned choice. Secondly, it will outline the specific Serbi-
an memory framework, with a particular focus on Kosovo. Finally, the theoretical 
model will be tested on the selected case study of Serbia’s foreign policy choice in 
2013 to sign the agreement with Kosovo with a discussion on how foreign policy 
traditions, narratives, dilemmas, beliefs, and resistance influenced Serbia’s foreign 
policy choice to accept the authority of Kosovo’s government over the entire dis-
puted territory. In conclusion, this article will identify whether Serbia’s foreign po-
licy choices in the case of Kosovo can be explained by the interpretative approach 
to foreign policy, as well as set future paths for research on the role of memory in 
foreign policy. 
Collective Memory in International Relations
In the last decade, collective memory has become an important field of research 
for numerous disciplines, such as sociology, history, philosophy, and psychology. 
As Jay Winter (2006: 43) observed, the debate on historical memory has become 
a “cultural obsession of monumental proportions across the globe”. Authors like 
Maier (1988) and Dian (2017) argued that in the 1980s and 1990s, scholars could 
observe a memory boom, which was fuelled by the third wave of democratisation 
when new democracies started to reflect on their past and paved the way towards 
the reconsideration of their national narratives (ibid.). The above mentioned third 
wave of democratisation, which was inherently connected with the end of the Cold 
War, triggered the process of revisiting national history in several regions, from 
East Asia to Central and East Europe and the Post-Soviet space (Berger, 2012). 
The importance of the memory boom, as observed by Charles Maier (1988), lies 
in “a retreat from transformative politics”, as it reflects a narrow focus on ethnici-
ty and nationalism as a substitute for communities based on ideologies and politi-
cal ideas. This argumentation is important as researchers could then tie collective 
memory with concepts such as identity, norms, and culture, and situate it within 
the studies of nationalism, ethnic identity, the politics of recognition and education 
(Assmann, 2001; Bell, 2010; Müller, 2002). In line with this, we could observe an 
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ever-growing body of scholarly work in the field of political science, where the 
main research focus lies in the nexus between collective memory and contemporary 
power struggles (Bachleitner, 2018: 11). By highlighting that memory is politically 
contested, the predominant literature advocates the instrumentalist approach, where 
focus is what people do with memory (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy, 2011: 
249–251; Berger, 2012: 12; Olick, 2007). Through such lens, the existing literature 
provides important insights into how collective memory affects the relationship of 
power within society, but only on the level of domestic politics. While authors like 
Edkins (2003), Fierke (2010), and Confino (1997) underlined that the emergence 
of collective memory is conceivable only within a given society as an outcome of 
a multifaceted interplay of political interests, the concrete integration of the con-
cept into International Relations is yet to be consistently introduced. Even though 
some researchers have managed to situate the above mentioned political interests 
within the broader argument that the political interests always reflect both national 
and international political goals, International Relations research, as Berger (1998: 
12–25) pointed out, exhibits an inclination to underrate the extent to which memory 
essentially impacts the policy-making processes. 
The small existing body of scholarly work within International Relations, 
which is centred on the concept of collective memory, can be divided into two main 
parts. The first utilises a normative approach towards collective memory while fo-
cusing on questions of justice, reconciliation, responsibility for past action and the 
obligation to remember the dead (Margalit, 2002; Elster, 2004; Olick, 2003). An im-
portant contribution in this regard was made by Elazar Barkan (2001), who assessed 
international state behaviour in terms of restitution and official apologies vis-à-vis 
their global increase as a signal of a newly emerging morality within the interna-
tional community. The second part of scholarly work, which is situated within the 
positivist approach paradigm, aims at explaining state behaviour with memory by 
resorting to the analysis of foreign policy decisions. Here we can mention Thomas 
Berger (2002) and Peter Katzenstein (1996), who evaluated how cultural narratives 
shape actors’ policies. An important research in this regard was conducted by Yuen 
Foong Khong (1992), who theorised how historical analogies are employed in fo-
reign policy decision-making, and Ernest May (1975), who exhibited how history 
is (mis)used in American foreign policy. Finally, we can mention Thomas Banchoff 
(1999), who went beyond the decision-making process and discussed broader fo-
reign policy implications resulting from historical memory. These works, which are 
divided into two main parts, can be further differentiated in terms of their theoreti-
cal approaches to collective memory, namely: i) Instrumentalist; ii) Historical De-
terminist; iii) Culturalist (Berger, 2012; Dian, 2017). This is important as they offer 
three different explanations of how collective memories arise and how agents shape 
or manipulate them for political purposes (Dian, 2017: 4). Furthermore, as Matteo 
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Dian stressed (ibid.: 4–5), they employ different conceptualisations regarding cen-
tral issues such as the relationship between history and memory; the possibility of 
conquering the memory of certain events while selecting others; insolence and rise 
of countermemories; and how states and leaders should come to terms with the past 
to achieve reconciliation. Even though the above mentioned theoretical approaches 
are important for situating the concept of collective memory within the discipline 
of International Relations, our aim is to introduce an alternative theory that explains 
the interaction between collective memory and foreign policy. Deriving from this, 
we will, in the next section, introduce a theoretical approach, which should be un-
derstood as a framework that integrates the main ideas and the concepts of the inter-
pretative approach to foreign policy with the study of collective memory. 
Collective Memory and Foreign Policy: Introducing the Interpretative 
Approach 
The interpretative approach is entrenched in numerous epistemological and onto-
logical postulations. Bevir and Daddow (2015: 4) argue that the interpretative ap-
proach “rests on the assumption that explanations for political action follow from 
an empathetic understanding of the social meaning that underpins political activity, 
especially how the processes of social representations are formed and internalised 
in the realm of the international”. By this, the authors directly rejected positivism, 
which is inherently related with mainstream International Relations theories, and 
advocated for more postfoundational epistemology that corresponds with the idea 
that social facts cannot be known either by pure reason or pure experience (Hall, 
2015). The latter is crucial for interpretivism as social facts, which emerge within a 
prior set of beliefs, function as a tool to analyse the social world by reference to how 
it is interpreted by agents (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). In line with this, the ontology 
behind the interpretative approach focuses on the human side of social action and 
rejects the idea that political and social behaviour can be straightforwardly deter-
mined by structures (Dian, 2017: 22). Actors in this regard are not simply motivat-
ed by a rational cost-benefit analysis, but instead resort to meanings and discourse 
that exist within the social structure in which they function (Bevir, 2015). For that 
reason, the interpretative approach to foreign policy as an alternative theoretical 
approach offers an evocative toolkit to scrutinise the process of redefinition of a 
country’s memory and the political struggle behind it, and, what is even more im-
portant, it elucidates the means by which the struggle over a nation’s past offers the 
fundamental ideational background for contemporary foreign policy choices (Dian, 
2017: 23). According to Dian (ibid.: 22–28), the key concepts, which are essential 
for the interpretative approach, are the following: beliefs, traditions, narrative, re-
sistance, and dilemmas. 
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The starting concept of the analysis are beliefs, which are crucial for under-
standing the actions of the agents. As already mentioned, due to the fact that the 
fundamental presumption of the approach is that agents are not only driven by pure 
or instrumental intentions, but rather by beliefs and intersubjective meanings, the 
operationalisation of the concept lies in the process of socialisation (Bevir, 2015). 
The latter should be, for the purpose of our analysis, understood through the prism 
of political socialisation, where each and every actor carries beliefs about a coun-
try’s past (Dian, 2017: 23). Socialisation is also important for traditions, but on the 
level of party politics – foreign policy decision-makers are first socialised into party 
politics and latter entrenched in foreign policy governance (Ninkovich, 2001).6 In 
line with this, policy choices are in advance limited by traditions, which function as 
a set of beliefs regarding a country’s past, its role and position in the world, its “he-
roes and enemies”, traumas and glories (Jorgensen, 2013).7 In democratic systems, 
where representatives of different traditions exist and compete against each other, 
the outcome of the (political) struggle to impose their own beliefs, which are inhe-
rently connected with traditions, becomes known as narrative (Dian, 2015; Subotić, 
2016). According to Patterson and Monroe (1998), Bell (2009), and Dian (2017), 
narrative is a very coherent story, where “chosen trauma, glory or myth”8 become a 
part and parcel for all the practices of remembrance and for the formation of collec-
tive memory. Narratives, which involve government’s rhetoric, education, and com-
memoration, follow the logic of three vital steps, namely: i) relation between facts 
and events; ii) amplification of a narrative relationship between events; iii) pro-
cess of selection of components that provide logical stability of the narrative (Som-
ers, 1994). Researchers that focus on narratives have managed to differentiate and 
create the narrative typology, which encompasses five “ideal types”. Hawe, Shiell 
and Riley (2009: 86) argue for “Against the odds”, “Heroic”, “Technologist”, “Ro-
mantic”, and “Satirist”, Dian (2017: 23–24) advocates “Glorification”, “Self-vic-
timhood”, “Amnesia”, “Acknowledgment”, and “Contrition”. We will focus on the 
typology of Dian (2017), as Hawe, Shiell and Riley (2009) situated the typology 
within the broader picture of community interventions dynamics. 
Depending on the used narrative, there will always be the possibility of resist-
ance. The latter emerges when narrative cannot be situated within the broader set 
6 Examples of traditions are Wilsonianism in the U.S., Gaullism in France, Peronism in Argen-
tina, and Christian conservatism in Germany (Hall, 2015; Croci, 2008; Dadow and Schnapper, 
2013). 
7 Traditions can be termed the political culture of foreign policy (Bevir and Daddow, 2015). 
8 As Widmaier (2007: 782) and Subotić (2016: 617) argued, traumatic events are useful win-
dows of opportunities for narrative activation as they provide intersubjective meaning to policy 
change (making it more acceptable). 
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of beliefs that are internalised by the general public. Resistance can be also closely 
observed when agents promote change and innovation by adjusting the main beliefs 
that support their tradition and the policies related with it. However, both innova-
tions and changes do not just happen, they are driven by dilemmas that arise when 
existing narrative is no longer in a position to provide a coherent refurbishment of 
past events based on current beliefs and knowledge of the past (Dian, 2017; Keane, 
1988). In other words, when the general public does not consider a narrative as va-
luable for contextualising the role of the country in the world, the internal landscape 
changes according to the new dynamic between domestic actors. 
The figure on the next page illustrates that this dilemma, which is dislocated, 
echoes the most important added value of the theoretical approach as it reflects 
the ability to explain change, not just the continuity. Dilemmas are, in the case of 
an interpretative approach to foreign policy, tackling rather stable narratives about 
a country’s past, which provide an ideational background for the most essential 
foreign policy choices. In line with this, the next section will be devoted to Serbi-
an memory framework, highlighting the main elements for our empirical analysis 
based on the core concepts presented above. 
Table 1. Five Ideal-type Narratives
Glorification Self-victimhood Amnesia Acknowledgment Contrition
Context State acknow-
ledges the ex-
tent of the past 
acts but consi-








to remove a 
particularly 
traumatic pe-





lence, but strives 
toward transcend-












suffering of the 
‘other’.
The state was 
‘pushed’ into 














tations and leaves 
enough space 






reflect on the 
‘problematic 
past’.
Sources: Lind (2009), Sekalala (2016), Dian (2017), Oaten (2014), Ziai (2004).
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The Position of Kosovo in Serbian Memory Framework
On 28 June 2001, as he entered a helicopter that flew him to the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, Slobodan Milošević, 
the former Yugoslav and Serbian president, supposedly questioned his guards if 
they knew that the day was Saint Vitus Day (Glas javnosti, 2001). Saint Vitus Day 
or Vidovdan is important as it is dedicated to Serbian prince Lazar Hrebeljanović, 
who fought and fell during the Battle of Kosovo against the Ottoman Empire on 15 
June 1389. The battle, accompanied by the legend regarding prince Lazar’s choice 
of the “heavenly empire” over the “earthly empire”, which determined the Serbian 
memory framework in a way that sacrifice vis-à-vis earthly loss in battle but eternal 
life in heaven along with victimisation vis-à-vis constant self-defense against great 
powers became inherently internalised by both the elite and the mass population 
(Subotić, 2013). The above mentioned sacrifice and victimisation, which were rec-
ognized as fundamental elements of Serbian collective memory by authors like Bie-
ber (2002), Noutcheva (2012), Djokić (2009), Stockdale (2009), and Subotić (2013: 
2016), are important in at least two ways. First, the Battle of Kosovo establishes “a 
historical continuity between the contemporary Serbian nation and the ‘Serbs’ of 
the Middle Ages” in a way that the Kosovo myth repetitively functions as a mecha-
nism for celebrating Serbian protagonists who wanted revenge for the loss of Ko-
sovo and the return of the “Serbian heart” (Bieber, 2002; Subotić, 2016). The latter 
insinuates that “Serbs will rise again” in a way that what is lost will be reclaimed 
and what has been grieved will be renowned. Second, the Battle of Kosovo became 
Figure 2. Main Features of the Interpretative Approach Vis-à-vis Their Intertwine 
within the Approach
  Political struggle
               Beliefs                Traditions              
Dilemma
                         Narrative              Resistance
                  Policy change
Source: Author.
Figure 1. Main Features of he Interpretative Approach vis-à-vis Their Intertwine 
within the Approach
Source: Author.
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the foundation for understanding the Serbian people as victims of foreign (major) 
powers in a way that what the Ottomans started had a continuation under the Hab-
sburgs, Croats and Slovenes, Germans in World War II, Albanians (Kosovo), Bos-
niaks (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Croats (in Croatia), and NATO in 1999 (Subotić, 
2016: 618). More recently, we can also add the EU in the context of its attempts to 
legitimise Kosovo’s secession from Serbia. 
The development of victimisation and sacrifice through the prism of the story 
of Kosovo was not spontaneous, and the (political) trigger was only dependent on 
the predominant ideology. The latter means that when nationalism replaced Yugo-
slav socialism, one part of the cultural and intellectual elite started to openly associ-
ate the Battle of Kosovo with Serbia’s contemporary political concerns with the lo-
gic that Serbian national interests are being loomed by other nations in the Yugoslav 
federation (ibid.). When Slobodan Milošević succeeded in eradicating the historical 
aloofness between past and present, the pursuit of “historical justice” manifested in 
Serbia’s war in Kosovo. The latter was also the main cause for NATO intervention 
in 1999, which only further hardened the Serbian perception of victimhood and in-
justice at the hand of great powers, as Jansen (2000) argued. Here we should also 
mention David (2013: 191), who said that all the governments after 1999 sponsored 
the memory of Serbian victimhood during the NATO intervention as if it were the 
central idea behind the wars in the 1990s. This did not diminish even after the fall 
of Slobodan Milošević in 2000 as the Serbian media insistently broadcasted and 
reported the attacks of Kosovo Albanians and the maltreatments of Serbs by the 
Kosovo Liberation Army, as well as documented the demolition of Serbian cultural 
sites (Bieber, 2002: 105). This, alongside with the official political positions of key 
policy actors through time, cemented the position of Kosovo within Serbian collec-
tive memory. As Di Lellio (2009), Ejdus and Subotić (2014), and Subotić (2016) 
showed, the above mentioned position was present in Serbian foreign policy nar-
rative 48 hours before Kosovo declared its independence9 and on 19 April 2013,10 
when the countries signed the Brussels Agreement. Deriving from this observation, 
the next section will test the interpretative approach on the case of 2013, when Ser-
bia concluded the agreement with Kosovo by which they accepted Kosovo govern-
ment’s control over the entire territory. 
9 Koštunica (2009: 207) argued that Kosovo should be understood as a synonym for the most 
valuable contribution made by Serbia to the Christian civilization, and for that reason no one can 
integrate Serbia into Europe without Kosovo. 
10 Serbian Prime minister Ivica Dačić said that great power meddling contributed to the dis-
agreements in the Balkans, and Serbian president Tomislav Nikolić argued that “the international 
community does not have a plan for Kosovo, but instead follows the great powers” (B92, 2013).
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Brussels Agreement between the Continuation, Shift and Policy Change 
Thirteen years after the fall of Slobodan Milošević and five years after Kosovo de-
clared its independence, Serbia concluded the Brussels Agreement under which it 
accepted Kosovo government’s control over the territory and in return negotiated 
significant autonomy to Serbs that live in the north of Kosovo (Ejdus and Subotić, 
2014). This policy change, which came rather late, intrinsically corresponded with 
the EU accession talks as the question of the normalisation of Serbia-Kosovo rela-
tions became the prerequisite for entering the EU. The latter functioned as a fun-
damental dilemma that tackled the stable narrative regarding the role of Kosovo in 
both Serbian contemporary politics and collective memory. By doing this, the Ser-
bian government had to justify this innovation/policy change to the general public 
as they believed, to a certain extent, that Kosovo would always belong to Serbia. As 
the internal landscape in terms of policy advocacy changed, the key policy actors 
started minimising the Brussels Agreement in a way that they began to promote the 
idea that no real policy change occurred. There was still a significant resistance as 
there were protests in Belgrade where one of the bishops even staged a “funeral” of 
the Serbian government and accused the government of betrayal (RTS, 2013). Fur-
thermore, in a month after the protests, the resistance translated into the public opi-
nion polls where 65% of Serbian citizens demanded that the government preserve 
Kosovo as part of Serbia (Balkan Insight, 2013). Several politicians such as Alek-
sandar Vučić (deputy Prime Minister), Ivica Dačić (Prime Minister), and Tomislav 
Nikolić (President) galvanised the sacrifice narrative, but this time they pushed for 
the impression that great powers forced Serbia to give up Kosovo (B92, 2013b). If 
Dačić was saying that “great power meddling contributed to the disagreements in 
the Balkans, and that each of them has its people in the Balkans”, Vučić argued that 
“the agreement is the only way for Serbia to survive, stay united and solve their 
problems together in the future” (Subotić, 2016: 622–623). 
As already mentioned above, when key policy actors promoted the idea that 
nothing really changed, they were, to a certain extent, right, as the years that fol-
lowed produced limited policy change. In this regard we can talk about a continu-
ation, as key policy actors like Ivica Dačić and Aleksandar Vučić still repetitively 
argue that “Brussels cannot expect that Serbia would commit the ‘historical hara-
kiri’ (suicide) by letting Kosovo go” (Ekspres, 2018), and that “Serbia’s fight for 
Kosovo is like a fight between David and Goliath” (RTS, 2018). The resistance by 
the general public is still present, as the Institute for European Studies located in 
Belgrade showed 81% of Serbs would not support the independence of Kosovo, and 
55% of the Serbian people believe that this government will not recognise Kosovo 
(ibid.). Finally, during the process of challenging foreign policy change, key policy 
actors played on some elements of Serbian collective memory, such as sacrifice and 
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historical injustice vis-à-vis the great powers argument, while leaving behind the 
notion of returning Kosovo at all costs. The combination of those elements means 
that the “loss of Kosovo” is narrated in a way that Serbia and its people are again 
witnessing the great sacrifice, but this time the perpetrator is the EU.11
Conclusion
Understanding contemporary social and political dynamics in correlation with the 
phenomenon of belongingness is never easy, as it could be observed in the case of 
Serbia. The Serbian collective memory, where the position of Kosovo, after more 
than 600 years, still functions as an important impetus for contemporary foreign 
policy choices, illustrates that not everything can be explained with materialistic 
arguments. If that were the case, then why Serbia, 20 years after the NATO inter-
vention and Kosovo war, would still relentlessly keep Kosovo in their contempo-
11 The statistics by Demostat survey is telling as we can observe that 76% of Serbs do not agree 
with the fact that Serbia should recognize Kosovo’s independence in exchange for EU member-
ship (Balkan Insight, 2018). 
Figure 2. Application of the Interpretative Approach to Brussels Agreement
Source: Author.
Figu  
           Absence of internal political struggle
              Brussels Agreement
Kosovo belongs to Serbia 
(anti-EU) vs. Kosovo is 
an independent country 
(pro-EU)




Protests in Belgrade and 
public poll where 65% of 
Serbian people demanded 
the preservation of Kosovo
Sacrifice 
vs. Victimisation
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rary policy endeavours if the EU perspective is dependent on the final outcome 
of the dialogue between the countries. The perplexing foreign policy choices of 
Serbia towards Kosovo after the fall of Slobodan Milošević until now are hard to 
explain without an interpretative approach to foreign policy, where policy choices 
are limited by a set of beliefs regarding country’s past, its heroes, traumas, and 
position in the world in advance. This, alongside with traditions, function as a 
cognitive template for narratives that should be understood as an element for jus-
tifying contemporary policy choices. In our case, the cultural and political instru-
mentalisation of the Battle of Kosovo, where eternal life in heaven and self-defense 
against great powers became a part and parcel of Serbian collective memory, acts 
as the driving force of Serbian political action. The added value of the interpreta-
tive approach lies in its ability to explain both change and continuation, as it could 
be observed in the case of the Brussels Agreement. If the Serbian foreign policy 
decision to accept Kosovo government’s control over the territory, which should 
be understood as change, was driven by the external dilemma of staying on the 
European path, the internal dilemma of not changing the stable narrative regarding 
the position of Kosovo to avoid resistance pushed key policy makers to minimise 
the change and stick to the perception of continuity. The latter was the case as the 
years that followed showed that nothing substantial actually changed, not even the 
official positions of Serbian political actors, as the fundamental internally-driven 
dilemma of Kosovo being the “heart of the nation” functioned as an element for 
preserving continuity. The case of Kosovo is not unique as there are many cases 
in contemporary International Relations that could be explored with the help of 
the interpretative approach in order to explain those contemporary foreign policy 
choices that are inherently connected with both the historical elements and the col-
lective memory of respective nations. If we move beyond the region of the West-
ern Balkans, this analysis can be applied to great benefit in other cases, like Ger-
many, Japan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia, all of which are facing similar internal 
and external dilemmas when conducting their foreign policies. All states have their 
myths, narratives and historical elements that are later intertwined and embedded 
into their collective memories. For that reason, my argument is, if we are talking 
more broadly, giving an example of the necessary analytical synthesis of foreign 
policy choices and collective memory in order to provide International Relations 
scholarship with another possible tool for integrating collective memory more di-
rectly into the study of the interpretative approach within the subdiscipline of fo-
reign policy. 
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